Fake passkey setup requests lead to Microsoft 365 account compromises

Microsoft Security Research has traced cloud account compromises to attackers posing as IT staff and telling employees they need to update their passkeys or other sign-in settings.
Microsoft says it has tracked the activity across multiple accounts since May.
Attackers added authentication methods they controlled, searched company cloud resources, and downloaded files from SharePoint and OneDrive. Some intrusions also extended to email collection through Exchange Online.
The passkey update was a pretext. Microsoft does not report that attackers stole a passkey or defeated a fingerprint or facial recognition check.
The approach begins with a call or text to an employee’s personal phone when the disguised IT helpdesk staff warns that the employee could lose access if they do not update a passkey, multifactor authentication, or single sign-on setting.
Attackers direct employees to pages that look similar to legitimate Microsoft sign-in screens.
They sometimes include the organization’s name in the web address or send similar requests through an already compromised employee’s Teams account.
If an employee opens the link on a personal phone that the organization does not monitor, investigators may have little evidence of the initial contact.
Microsoft describes several routes from the request to account access.
In one sequence, an attacker-controlled site relayed a sign-in to Microsoft and captured credentials and a session token after the employee completed an MFA check that was not phishing-resistant.
In another instance, the employee entered a device code on Microsoft’s real authentication page. The step authorized an attacker-controlled client to receive a token.
Microsoft also describes a later sign-in using compromised credentials and an authenticator app method that appears to have been registered by the attacker days earlier.
Adding a phone number, authenticator app, or software one-time password method can help an attacker satisfy future authentication challenges.
The attackers used Microsoft Graph to examine users, permissions, applications, and available files.
Microsoft observed SharePoint and OneDrive downloads and, in some cases, email access through Exchange. The data collection continued for hours and days, and sometimes fewer than 1,000 files or emails were accessed per hour.
Microsoft recommends requiring phishing-resistant MFA, restricting the registration of new authentication methods, and blocking device-code sign-ins where they are not needed.
For compromised accounts, it advises revoking sessions, removing unauthorized methods, and securely registering the user’s methods.
The activity shows why phishing-resistant authentication alone is not enough if attackers can manipulate account recovery, authentication-method registration and post-login access.
Article Topics
cybersecurity | Microsoft | passkeys | passwordless authentication






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