Inspector General finds CBP let migrants enter US with fake ID documents

A new report by the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) inspector general (IG) says Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is failing to consistently detect, document, and act on the use of fraudulent immigration and identity documents at U.S. borders – shortcomings the watchdog warns could allow criminals or national-security threats to slip through.

The audit found unclear training requirements, technology gaps in vehicle lanes at land ports, and spotty case documentation that together undermine CBP’s front-line defenses against impostors and forged papers.

The Office of Inspector General reviewed a targeted sample of 60 immigration cases from fiscal years 2022 through early 2024 in which migrants were suspected of using fraudulent documents.

Although such individuals are generally inadmissible and subject to detention and removal, 47 of the 60 – nearly 78 percent – were ultimately allowed to enter the United States; six were removed, four were detained pending further action, and three were admitted after CBP resolved concerns about the documents.

The IG also found that nearly half of the immigration A-files it examined – 28 of 60 – were missing readily available information about the suspected document fraud, limiting what immigration adjudicators and government lawyers could see when making decisions.

An Alien File is the comprehensive, unique file containing all official U.S. immigration and naturalization records for an individual, identified by a unique A-Number.

The audit report situates its findings in a well-documented historical risk. As the 9/11 Commission observed, terrorist operatives have long treated travel documents “as important as weapons,” exploiting forged or altered passports and IDs to move undetected. The inspector general says CBP’s uneven training, equipment limitations, and inconsistent evidentiary practices create similar vulnerabilities today.

The audit’s principal finding is not that CBP lacks tools, but that the agency has not built a reliable, recurring regimen to keep officers and agents proficient or to ensure the tools are available where they matter most.

Officers assigned to ports of entry, Border Patrol agents operating between ports, and Office of Air and Marine operations teams all receive some initial instruction on impostor detection and document security features, but the IG found there is no clearly mandated, agency-wide requirement for periodic refresher training.

This despite evolving fraud tactics and a sprawling patchwork of genuine documents with holograms, color-shifting inks, and other features that require practiced inspection.

In fact, when CBP’s Fraudulent Document Analysis Unit (FDAU) and a field office tried to make two refresher courses “mandatory,” they did so without the proper level of approval, so the courses never showed up as required in CBP’s training system and many officers never took them.

Border Patrol and Air and Marine personnel told auditors they had not received refresher training in years and wanted more.

Technology gaps complicate the picture, particularly at land ports. CBP has extensively deployed facial comparison for pedestrians and in airport environments, but the IG said the agency still lacks a viable, fully implemented solution to capture biometric images from people in vehicles moving through land-border car lanes.

That means officers often rely on manual, eyes-only checks against photos on travel documents, an approach the IG said “potentially” limits both efficiency and effectiveness.

Auditors who visited the Nogales, Arizona port of entry observed a case in which a person using fraudulent papers passed primary inspection in a vehicle lane and was only flagged later during a secondary procedure.

These findings echo the watchdog’s June 2024 report on screening and vetting which found DHS did not have technology in place to perform biometric matching for travelers arriving in vehicles at land ports and used inconsistent inspection practices across locations.

That recommendation remains open, the IG noted.

The IG also documented basic breakdowns in chain-of-custody and intelligence sharing. CBP policy requires that fraudulent travel and identity documents seized by officers or agents be removed from circulation and sent to the FDAU within 14 days, or at minimum photographed and transmitted if the physical item cannot be shipped.

In 23 of the 60 cases the IG reviewed, the fraudulent document selected for review never reached the FDAU. During site visits to stations and ports in San Diego and Tucson sectors, auditors found bins and drawers with counterfeit IDs that had not been forwarded. In some instances, agents said they had returned seized fraudulent documents to the individuals, who were then likely released into the country.

After the IG reminded local offices of the policy, officials said they would comply going forward. The IG warned that failing to centralize those artifacts deprives CBP of trend analysis and training material, and risks the fakes being reused for illicit travel, financial fraud, or identity crimes.

Beyond the 60-case sample, the IG’s audit offers broader context on the scale of the problem. From fiscal years 2022 through 2024, officers at ports of entry and Border Patrol agents identified 7,754 fraudulent documents, including fake or altered passports, birth certificates, driver’s licenses, and Social Security cards. The Office of Field Operations accounted for 6,056 of those and Border Patrol for 1,698. In fiscal 2024 alone, CBP reported more than 2.9 million encounters at and between ports of entry.

The audit also details a data-access dispute. The report says CBP denied the inspector general direct, read-only access to the BorderStat reporting tool and the Automated Criminal/Customs and Immigration Data Integration System (ACADIS) training database, opting instead to provide extracts. ACADIS maintains records of CBP officers’ training completion and personnel information.

While the IG said the data were sufficiently complete and reliable for the audit, the denial underscores persistent frictions over internal oversight access to operational systems.

Some of the report’s most sensitive findings involve what happens after fraud is suspected. In the cases reviewed, individuals were sometimes paroled or released into the interior despite apparent inadmissibility based on fraudulent documents.

The agency noted that officers and agents must weigh available detention space, prosecutorial guidance from U.S. attorneys, humanitarian parole rules, and asylum protocols that can lead to release even when fraud is suspected, especially if a person claims fear of return and receives a “credible fear” finding from an asylum officer.

CBP, for its part, concurred with all five of the IG’s recommendations and said it has already closed three. The open items focus on making fraudulent-document training mandatory annually and enforcing the requirement that seized fraudulent documents flow to the FDAU.

CBP has pledged to mandate the updated FDAU web-based course for relevant personnel by January 30, 2026, and Border Patrol has committed to annual requirements for agents.

CBP also enhanced its e3 processing module on June 2 so that when agents check the “fraudulent document” box, a narrative auto-populates on Form I-213 and cross-references the Form I-44 seizure report, ensuring the fraud allegation lands in the A-file that immigration judges and government attorneys see.

On February 28, Border Patrol adopted a broader charging posture emphasizing use of every available federal, state, and local offense to strengthen cases, including crimes tied to document fraud.

Article Topics

CBP  |  DHS  |  document verification  |  identity document  |  synthetic identity fraud