Internal struggle over US federal biometric data management intensifies

As the U.S. federal government expands its use of biometric technologies to manage everything from border security to federal benefits, an internal debate over the future of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Office of Biometric Identity Management (OBIM) has emerged as a flashpoint. Conversations inside the Trump administration, believed to be led by influential White House adviser Stephen Miller, have fueled concerns about the potential consolidation of OBIM under the direct control of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP).

While no official decision has been announced, multiple sources confirmed that the move has been given serious consideration as part of a broader strategy to align federal biometric capabilities with hardline immigration enforcement.

According to sources, a meeting was held between officials of the newly created Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), OBIM leadership, and CBP representatives to reevaluate the current trajectory of federal biometric systems. DOGE is the federal entity originally overseen by Elon Musk and which has embedded itself within OBIM. DOGE’s activities inside OBIM have stirred alarm within civil liberties and national security circles.

Operating within the DHS’s Management Directorate, OBIM is a critical but often overlooked part of the federal surveillance infrastructure that is responsible for managing the Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT), a massive database that contains 320 million biometric records on nearly as many individuals. IDENT is in the process of being replaced by the problem-plagued Homeland Advanced Recognition Technology (HART) platform, a next-generation system incorporating cloud-based analytics, facial recognition, and iris and fingerprint matching.

Unlike the traditional law enforcement arms of DHS, OBIM was deliberately structured as a neutral entity designed to provide biometric services to multiple agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Defense, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). It is not an enforcement agency, but rather an infrastructure provider whose neutrality ensures consistency, data integrity, and privacy protections across federal operations.

That neutrality now hangs in the balance, if sources are to be believed. According to sources familiar with internal discussions, the White House is weighing whether to relocate OBIM under the authority of CBP, which would represent a dramatic realignment that would effectively transform OBIM from a cross-agency biometric service provider into a tactical arm of one of the government’s most aggressive enforcement bodies

“There is a good chance that OBIM will be forced into CBP, which will mean that the 40-plus stakeholders that OBIM currently has could well be treated secondarily to the CBP-centric border mission,” one source told Biometric Update on condition of anonymity, adding, “That would not be a great outcome.”

The implications of such a move would be sweeping. CBP already operates with considerable autonomy and controls one of the largest surveillance infrastructures in the federal government. It has been criticized repeatedly by watchdog groups for launching programs like the Traveler Verification Service — a facial recognition program deployed at airports and border crossings — without adequate privacy assessments or meaningful opt-out options for U.S. citizens.

A 2020 Government Accountability Office (GAO) audit documented how CBP failed to consistently adhere to its own privacy policies, further eroding public trust. Placing OBIM under CBP would effectively grant the agency total control over the nation’s largest biometric database, raising alarms about unchecked surveillance, diminished transparency, and weakened interagency coordination.

Even from a technical perspective, the move raises questions. One source told Biometric Update that IDENT and the incoming HART system “go well beyond what CBP knows how to run in terms of infrastructure and interoperability.”

“CBP would be in over its head if it tried to manage OBIM by itself,” another source familiar with the matter said, adding, “[OBIM] might as well be put under” Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).

OBIM’s systems interface with dozens of federal agencies and foreign partners. CBP’s infrastructure, while robust for enforcement tasks, was never designed to operate at that scale or complexity.

The push to consolidate OBIM under CBP appears to be driven in large part by Stephen Miller, Trump’s longtime immigration policy architect who now serves as Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy. Miller’s influence on immigration has been both ideological and operational, steering policy efforts such as the Muslim travel bans, family separation strategy, and reductions in refugee and visa admissions.

Miller reportedly is leading a Homeland Security Council task force to evaluate all federal biometric programs, including OBIM. Sources said Miller believes OBIM is too far removed from frontline enforcement and wants to integrate it more closely with CBP and ICE, enabling faster, more aggressive deportation actions.

“A White House group helmed by national security adviser Stephen Miller and other homeland security‑focused leaders has taken up a new focus: evaluating the federal government’s powerful biometrics program,” a White House spokesperson confirmed, adding, “The Homeland Security Council is now working with federal agencies and departments to review ‘all biometrics programs to ensure they perform as efficiently and effectively as possible.’”

The consolidation effort is being framed internally as a “modernization” initiative that is part of the White House’s government efficiency campaign. But critics point to the role of DOGE as evidence that modernization may be a pretext for political restructuring. DOGE has embedded personnel directly within OBIM, and multiple sources confirm that longstanding leadership at the office is either departing or being forced out. More than 260,000 federal employees have either been fired or accepted buyouts since DOGE’s creation.

DOGE’s role is not merely advisory. Sources suggest that it has gained operational access to OBIM systems, raising the specter of unauthorized data manipulation or policy shifts without legal oversight. With Miller overseeing the broader review, and DOGE embedded on the ground, sources are worried that the combined effect could be a partisan takeover of America’s biometric infrastructure.

This concern is amplified by OBIM’s sensitive international role. The agency is central to U.S. biometric data-sharing agreements with allies such as the Five Eyes intelligence alliance and the European Union. Many of those agreements include legal safeguards ensuring that data is not used for enforcement purposes. A shift in OBIM’s governance could jeopardize these relationships, especially if foreign partners come to view the agency as something other than a neutral service provider.

From a domestic perspective, the implications extend well beyond immigration. OBIM plays a vital role in benefit adjudication, counterterrorism vetting, naturalization processing, and interagency identity matching. If placed under CBP or another DHS component, there’s a risk that it would fragment the national biometric enterprise, introducing inconsistencies and security vulnerabilities into a system that was deliberately designed to be unified and interoperable.

Sources said they are particularly alarmed by the possibility that centralized control under CBP would erode legal safeguards. CBP’s historic resistance to privacy oversight, combined with its operational focus on interdiction and enforcement, makes it a poor steward of biometric identity systems. Critics argue that such a move would result in longer retention periods, more intrusive data collection, and, potentially, real-time tracking of individuals without appropriate legal authority or transparency.

A reorganization might also implicate federal data laws like the Privacy Act of 1974 and the E-Government Act, both of which govern how federal agencies collect, use, and share personal information. Any violation of these statutes could open the door to legal challenges and further erode public trust.

What remains especially troubling is the timing and secrecy surrounding the move. OBIM is currently in the midst of a complex transition from IDENT to the HART platform, a massive modernization undertaking that requires stability, expertise, and interagency coordination. Embedding DOGE personnel and preparing OBIM for absorption into CBP or another agency mid-transition introduces the risk of technical failure, misconfiguration, and even data loss.

A GAO report already flagged vulnerabilities in IDENT’s matching logic and infrastructure. Without rigorous oversight, the risk of compromised identity verifications or faulty matches could skyrocket, potentially harming U.S. citizens and immigrants alike.

Miller’s broader goal appears clear: to reshape biometric identity systems into tools of enforcement rather than neutral verification. His past efforts to use data to track sponsors of migrant children and to expedite deportations suggest a philosophy in which data is not a safeguard, but a weapon. If successful in moving OBIM, Miller will have transformed the government’s most neutral biometric clearinghouse into an operational asset for aggressive border enforcement, and perhaps more ominously, for centralizing identity surveillance.

That transformation would carry costs far beyond DHS. It would signal to Americans that their biometric identifiers — fingerprints, facial images, iris scans — are not merely verification tools, but also are instruments of surveillance and control. It would redefine biometric data from a means of accessing benefits to a mechanism of exclusion. And it would accelerate the shift from shared services and interagency cooperation toward single-agency dominance, weakening transparency and concentrating power.

At present, OBIM remains under the DHS management directorate, continuing to serve over 40 stakeholders across the federal government. Its neutrality, however, is under siege. With DOGE in its ranks, Miller at the helm of a reorganization task force, and the Trump administration’s agenda pointing toward centralized enforcement, the future of federal biometric governance is increasingly uncertain.

The stakes could not be higher. A move to place OBIM under CBP would not merely reshape agency charts or redefine reporting lines, it would also fundamentally alter the balance of power between transparency and control, between interagency coordination and surveillance dominance, and between democratic oversight and unchecked federal authority.

In a world where biometric data defines access to everything from borders to ballots, the question of who controls that data is one of the most important policy questions of our time. Whether the American public, and its representatives in Congress, are prepared to grapple with that reality remains to be seen.

Article Topics

biometric data  |  biometrics  |  CBP  |  DHS  |  Homeland Advanced Recognition Technology (HART)  |  OBIM  |  Traveler Verification Service  |  U.S. Government