US lawmakers demand FBI reconsider certifying biometric scanners from China

In a sharply worded bipartisan July 15 letter, Representatives John Moolenaar and Raja Krishnamoorthi — Chairman and Ranking Member of the House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party — called on FBI Director Kash Patel to immediately end the bureau’s certification of biometric and surveillance products from Chinese companies with ties to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and Ministry of State Security (MSS).

The letter accuses the FBI of granting a de facto endorsement to at least 32 Chinese companies whose biometric devices are listed on the bureau’s Certified Products List (CPL), despite U.S. government findings that many of these entities are deeply embedded in China’s military-industrial complex and surveillance apparatus. Moolenaar and Krishnamoorthi argue that CPL inclusion effectively provides a marketing advantage and sends a misleading signal of legitimacy.

The letter marks a rare moment of bipartisan alignment at a time of deep political polarization in Washington. It also reflects growing unease across the political spectrum about the depth and scope of China’s technological integration into Western markets.

By calling out what they see as a glaring national security oversight, Moolenaar, a Republican, and Krishnamoorthi, a Democrat, have put bipartisan pressure not only on Patel and the FBI, but also the Trump administration to recalibrate its role in technology governance and foreign supply chain vetting.

According to the FBI, “the products listed [on the CPL] are certified by the FBI as tested and in compliance with the FBI’s Next Generation Identification Image Quality Specifications. The review of the test data was conducted by the FBI’s Criminal Justice Information Services Division. The certification process is not intended to endorse one product over a competitor’s product but merely to certify the product meets FBI image quality standards.”

While the CPL does not constitute a purchase order or government contract, it often serves as a benchmark used by federal agencies, law enforcement entities, and commercial actors to assess the interoperability and reliability of biometric systems.

That certification, the lawmakers argue, has effectively become a “seal of approval” that legitimizes dangerous technologies. Technologies that are either developed in cooperation with Chinese military institutions or directly implicated in state-sponsored surveillance and repression.

“Including these products on the Certified Products List grants these companies the FBI’s seal of approval, which they can leverage to market their products as FBI-approved to customers in the U.S. government, elsewhere in the United States, and around the globe,” Moolenaar and Krishnamoorthi said in their letter to Patel.

“This sends a dangerous signal to potential buyers that these companies’ products are trustworthy and heightens the risk that these products will be procured by U.S. government entities or contractors despite the security risks,” the two lawmakers said. “It also sends conflicting messages about U.S. policy toward companies with ties to the PRC’s military-industrial complex.”

Among the most high-profile concerns raised is the FBI’s March recertification of Hikvision’s HK300 PIV fingerprint scanner, which had been added to the FBI’s CPL in January. This even though in 2018 national security concerns caused Congress to ban federal agencies or contractors from procuring anything “produced by” Hikvision.

Hikvision, officially known as Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Co., Ltd., has been sanctioned by the U.S. under three separate national security and human rights regimes, each reflecting intensifying concerns over its role in the Chinese government’s surveillance apparatus and its ties to the Chinese Communist Party’s military-industrial complex.

The most recent sanction was made in Executive Order 13959, which was signed in November 2020 to address the risk posed by U.S. capital flowing into companies identified as being part of the Chinese military-industrial complex. Hikvision was designated under this order due to its connections to military and security operations in China. The order restricts U.S. persons from investing in or trading publicly traded securities of the named entities.

In June 2021, Executive Order 14032 expanded the scope of these restrictions and reaffirmed Hikvision’s placement on the Non-SDN Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Companies List maintained by the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control. This list identifies companies that are considered part of the Chinese military-industrial complex, and includes companies involved in both defense and surveillance technology.

The intent of the investment restrictions is not only to safeguard American investors from inadvertently funding authoritarian repression but also to isolate firms that contribute to China’s military modernization and global surveillance footprint. Hikvision, by virtue of its central role in enabling China’s domestic security state, was considered emblematic of the type of company that U.S. financial policy should actively disengage from.

Yet, despite these prohibitions, the FBI continues to include Hikvision on its certification list, a move Moolenaar and Krishnamoorthi warn could mislead other government purchasers and undermine broader efforts to insulate critical systems from Chinese influence.

The letter provides a detailed analysis of the risks associated with at least fourteen of the 32 PRC-based companies currently included in the CPL. These companies, according to committee findings, have either partnered with Chinese intelligence agencies, participated in domestic repression, or are affiliated with entities on the U.S. Entity List published by the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security. This is a list of foreign individuals, businesses, and organizations subject to specific export, reexport, and transfer (in-country) license requirements.

For example, Beijing Hisign Technology is closely linked to Huawei and Inspur, both of which the Department of Defense has identified as Chinese military companies. Eyecool, another certified vendor, provides biometric systems to both the People’s Liberation Army and China’s Ministry of Public Security and has reportedly played a significant role in Skynet and Sharp Eyes, China’s vast and pervasive public surveillance systems.

Shenzhen-based Miaxis Biometrics is a wholly owned subsidiary of a firm that partners directly with China’s Ministry of State Security. It is also closely affiliated with other U.S.-sanctioned firms, including Hikvision and Dahua. The committee noted that Miaxis was once touted as a “key supplier” of fingerprint collection equipment to the Ministry of Public Security, though this language has been quietly scrubbed from its recent public disclosures.

Other certified companies include Luxshare Precision, whose wholly owned subsidiary has been implicated in forced labor programs involving Uyghur workers, and ZTEway Technology, a company that supplies fingerprint recognition systems for China’s national ID card program and holds military-grade certifications from the PLA Information Security Evaluation Center.

These companies, the letter states, exemplify a broader problem of “dual use” technology vendors leveraging U.S. certification to expand market share, even as their products are used domestically by the Chinese Communist Party to repress dissidents, monitor ethnic minorities, and support its military expansion.

Moolenaar and Krishnamoorthi contend that this certification practice directly contradicts longstanding U.S. national security policy. In supporting this view, they cite not only the sanctions and export restrictions already imposed on several of these firms, but also the broader legislative and regulatory architecture meant to limit the influence of the PRC’s surveillance state.

The lawmakers noted that the FBI’s certification could create “conflicting messages” for government contractors and buyers, inadvertently encouraging procurement from entities that other parts of the federal government have deemed national security threats.

The committee’s letter demands that the FBI immediately review its Certified Products List and cross-reference it against existing sanctions, the Commerce Department’s Entity List, and relevant national security determinations. It urges the FBI to develop a comprehensive policy framework to prevent the future certification of devices from companies linked to foreign adversaries.

Further, the letter requests a formal written response from Patel within 30 days that outlines the steps taken by the FBI to align its product certification process with the broader goals of national defense and cybersecurity. The two lawmakers also left open the possibility of legislative action if existin laws prove insufficient.

“Should the FBI’s position be that the law needs to be changed,” the letter states, “we welcome your input on potential legislation.”

This signals that congressional oversight of biometric surveillance technologies and their supply chains is likely to intensify in the months ahead, particularly as U.S. agencies accelerate the adoption of identity verification tools and AI-enabled analytics in both domestic and international operations.

The implications of the FBI’s certification list extend well beyond the agency itself. U.S. federal procurement systems often rely on third-party certifications as a precondition for purchase, particularly in areas like criminal justice, border enforcement, and cybersecurity.

Devices with FBI certification are also frequently marketed abroad as “U.S.-approved,” helping Chinese firms bolster their international competitiveness even as U.S. allies grow more wary of PRC technology vendors. In this way, a single certification decision, like the one granted to Hikvision’s fingerprint scanner, can reverberate across multiple layers of public and private procurement, both inside and outside the U.S.

Moreover, the committee’s investigation underscores a structural contradiction in the U.S. approach to PRC-linked technology. It shows that while one arm of the government blacklists a company for its role in oppression or military modernization, another quietly affirms the same company’s products as reliable or secure.

This bifurcation, Moolenaar and Krishnamoorthi argue, not only jeopardizes national security, but it also erodes the integrity of the U.S.’s strategic messaging to its allies, contractors, and the global tech ecosystem.

The July 15 letter is not the committee’s first foray into the murky world of biometric surveillance and foreign technology threats. Since its inception, the Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the U.S. and the Chinese Communist Party has probed deeply into a wide range of technologies with dual-use capabilities, including drones, AI surveillance tools, and telecommunications infrastructure.

The committee has held hearings on the CCP’s use of American data and the role of Chinese companies in influencing global tech standards.

In targeting the FBI’s certification practices, however, Moolenaar and Krishnamoorthi have chosen a new and particularly sensitive battleground. The FBI’s own reputation hinges on its leadership in law enforcement and counterintelligence.

If the bureau is shown to be providing tacit endorsements to adversarial technology, the consequences could include diminished trust from other federal agencies, weakened credibility with foreign partners, and expanded vulnerability to hostile intelligence operations.

As of this writing, the FBI has not issued a public response. Whether the bureau will move to decertify the flagged companies or push back on the committee’s recommendations remains to be seen. But with multiple national security statutes already in place, and Congress signaling a willingness to legislate further, the days of quiet certification for foreign adversary-linked tech firms may be numbered.

Article Topics

biometric testing  |  biometrics  |  certification  |  China  |  FBI  |  national security  |  standards  |  U.S. Government