Swiss e-ID delayed to December, renewed focus on security and trustworthiness

Switzerland ranks slightly above average in the OECD’s 2025 Digital Government Index (DGI), placing 13th overall. The result would seem to reflect the national mood when it comes to digital identity.

A recent referendum on the government’s electronic identity card (e-ID) Act showed voters in favor of a biometric digital ID by the narrowest of margins: a mere 50.39 percent.

Given the response, as well as a sprinkling of controversy, a government release says broad acceptance of the biometric e-card is to be “further strengthened” through efforts to address the main points of criticism raised by those opposed to the digital identity scheme – and its launch is delayed until December 2026.

“The adjustments focus in particular on further strengthening data protection and trustworthiness in the use of the e-ID and the associated infrastructure,” says the release. This responds in part to concerns about security vulnerabilities in the encryption of user data.

Now,  in advance of any data queries, providers will be required to record their stated purpose in a publicly accessible federal register. Only legally authorized providers will be able to retrieve users’ AHV (old-age and survivors insurance) numbers. Unregistered providers, or over-requesting information, will trigger a warning from the Swiyu wallet.

The ID documents will house a microchip containing two fingerprints and a facial image, the same as the current Swiss biometric passport. The blank cards are provided by Thales DIS Schweiz AG.

‘All planned further developments must currently be abandoned’

Originally slated for Summer 2026, the Swiss e-ID program is now scheduled to go live on December 1. Security concerns fueling the delay extend to the technical and administrative, notably regarding the lack of a “corresponding concept for user data encryption for the e-ID” and the trust infrastructure generally.

A rash of recent budget cuts prompts the government to include an assurance that “cost-cutting measures have no impact on the security of the e-ID and the e-ID trust infrastructure.”

But it also includes a frank statement on the future: the cuts mean that “all planned further developments must currently be abandoned, in particular the connection to international e-ID systems, the federal government’s back-up service, and the issuance of e-IDs in third-party wallets.”

Moreover, more cuts may also mean that “the federal government does not have sufficient financial resources to develop additional digital credentials in addition to the e-ID” – although this does not apply to the country’s mobile driver’s license (mDL).

In short, what’s paid for will proceed, but the path forward is currently closed.

Article Topics

biometrics  |  digital ID  |  digital ID infrastructure  |  e-ID  |  government services  |  OECD DGI  |  Switzerland